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On July 21,1904, a levy on Leping's major product, indigo, sparked 
a peasant riot. The levy was imposed to raise funds for the 
establishment of a school under the Qing state's "new policy" for 
modernization. "The rioters", as British Consul at Jiujiang, Walter 
Clennell reported, "made a demonstration at the Hsien Yamen, then 
destroyed a lijin office and finished the day's amusement by 
wrecking the houses of some native catholics."' Rioters included 
not only peasants but also landlords, merchants and other members 
of the indigo peasant community. Steered by a local branch of the 
Triads, Bianganghui (Whip the Strong Society), the riot swiftly 
turned into an uprising and engulfed the whole of the district and 
nearby regons. Witnessing its magnitude, a reporter commented 
that "it seems as if we must call it a rebellion rather than a riot."2 It 
persisted for more than two months and petered out only after a 
superior and well-armed imperial force was dispatched from the 
outside. 
This uprising was the largest peasant agitation in Leping since the 
Taiping turbulence. Its origin lay in the subsistence crisis of indigo 
peasants. In the early twentieth century, diminishing returns from 
indigo, once a highly profitable cash crop, disrupted the peasant 
household economy not only in Leping but also in other specialized 
areas of its production in ~ i a n ~ x i . ~  The expanding long distance 
trade and foreign encroachments during this period restricted the 
traditional, relatively autonomous nature of indigo production and 
distribution, and exacerbated the subsistence dilemma of peasants. 
The origin of the Leping Uprising thus should not be seen apart 
from the specific local crisis confronted by indigo producing peasant 
households. 
Yet, the Uprising was a result of crisis not merely in the peasant 
household economy but also in the local community. This was 
evinced in its heterogeneous character, avowed eclectic targets, and 
disciplined polyphonic manifestations. Its capacity to swiftly 
mobilize peasant masses, expand to a larger area, and persist till 
suppression by superior forces suggests that there was also a strong 
local consensus behind the tumult. Its characteristics were thus 
similar to many peasant agitations which erupted with renewed 
vigor in Jiangxi and other regions of China during the last decade 
of the Qing. Unlike the colossal peasant movements of the 
mid-nineteenth century, these were all localized events, originating 
from their own specific crises and following their own trajectories. 
The significance of these uprisings thus coincided with a con- 
juncture of forces during the late Qing, marking the dislocations of 
all social, political and economic forces that had shaped the rural 
communities. They were as much causes as effects of the con- 
juncture. Scholars have often discussed them as spasmodic out- 
bursts symptomatic of the endemic unrest of the period. Their 
eruptions have been linked to such immediate provocations as tax 
exactions, natural disasters, food crisis, xenophobic "anti-foreign- 
ism", or popular notions of "anti-feudalism and anti-irnperiali~m."~ 
That they displayed symptoms of a community in crisis is often 
relegated to the background. 
This paper thus examines the 1904 Leping Uprising in the context 
of multiple crises in the peasant household economy and the local 
highland community. These, unlike the mid-nineteenth century 
rebellions, generated several parallel movements integrated within 
an uprising. The Uprising thus reflected the characteristic pattern of 
the community itself. While, in the early twentieth century, the 
notion of a community still emerged at a particular conjuncture and 
informed the political action, the moral fabric of the community was 
becoming progressively so porous that it often failed to contain 
competing entrenched sectoral interests beyond a certain stage.5 The 
paper focuses on indigo as well as on the state and the Christian 
church - whose interventions in the local area made them major 
targets of attacks during the Uprising. What was the crisis con- 
fronted by indigo producing peasants in the early twentieth 
century? What new trends did affect the rhythm of the traditional 
order of indigo production, trade, and market? Also, what impact 
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did the intrusion of the Christian missions have on the local 
community? Finally, in the context of the above questions, how and 
why did the new levy to raise funds for a school under the "New 
Policy" of the Qing state, provoke the community to resort to 
violence? Such a focus, transcending explanations, which view the 
events as spasmodic "anti-taxation and anti-missionary riots" or 
"anti- Manchu/feudal and anti-imperialism" stirrings of the masses, 
should help us better comprehend the local crisis and the Uprising. 
Indigo and the Political Economy of Leping Highland 
The economy and society of Leping, a mountainous district in the 
Raozhou prefecture of northeastern Jiangxi, evolved to a great 
extent around the cultivation and marketing of in dig^.^ Along with 
the Yugan district of the same prefecture, Leping produced the best 
quality of indigo in the province. The local red alluvial and 
phosphate-rich soil yielded a bountiful harvest. Almost all of the 
local produce was exported to famous cotton and textile centers in 
the Jiangnan area, where it was used for dyeing purposes. It was 
marketed in the form of dye paste or powder. Depending upon 
resources, peasants either home-processed the leaves or sold them 
in baskets to local middlemen-merchants, who handled that for 
export. Leping's location on the traditional river-land trade route 
kept its local markets well connected with famous grand markets. 
An intricate link between the subsistence production and the market 
characterized the local society. 
Indigo was introduced to Leping by new settlers or pengmin (shed 
people) who opened up the barren highland for cultivation and 
residence in the late seventeenth century. These pengmin were part 
of a large and protracted process of inter-regional migration 
resulting from the late Ming-early Qing demographic crisis in 
commercialized Southeast China. Spilling over from neighboring 
densely populated regons, they flowed to Jiangxi in separate waves 
and filled up the desolate highland by the end of the eighteenth 
c e n t ~ r y . ~  A 1724 investigation found them settled in all but four 
prefectures of the province.' As they moved in, they also brought 
in to the highland new techniques for the production of such recent 
subsistence and cash crops as indigo, jute, sweet potatoes, and 
maize. These crops, as Ho Pingti aptly remarks, brought about a 
"revolution in land utilization" in China transforming un- or under- 
settled highland into a socially and economically flourishing area.g 
The pengmin in Leping and other districts of northeast Jiangxi 
generally came from Fujian. Many of them possibly migrated from 
Fujian's Dingzhou prefecture which, during the Ming period, was 
a major source of indigofera - the dark blue dye of commerce once 
known as the "king of the  dyestuff^".'^ While dyes were manufac- 
tured from many varieties of plants throughout China, the one 
produced from the dark blue species of indigofera, probably I. 
sumatrana and I. tinctoria introduced from Southeast Asia and 
India, proved to be the best and brightest and became famous as 
"unequalled under the heaven."" Demographic pressures coupled 
with growing demands for the dye in expanding textile centers 
stimulated movement of these indigo producing Dingzhou peasants 
into neighboring regions. They first settled in the mountainous zone 
along Fuchun river in South Zhejiang which, through river and sea 
routes, was connected with Jiangnan's grand markets. From there, 
they gradually spread to highland areas on the traditional river-land 
trade route that traversed through the boundaries of Jiangxi, Fujian 
and zhejiang.12 
The pengmin included both rich and poor. Some acquired large 
tracts of highland and turned into landlords. In order to open up 
barren land for cultivation, they invited and hired poor migrants as 
laborers. Many, however, provided these and later settlers such 
privileges as the right to permanent tenancy. Others came as, or 
gradually became, independent smallholders. These pengmin 
essentially reproduced the small peasant economy of their native 
area, and vigorously pursued various forms of commercial 
agriculture on the highland. The process of their settlement was, 
however, not peaceful. As the highlands became a new source for 
local wealth and power, both the pengmin and natives competed 
fiercely for this larger spoil. Tensions between them provoked 
frequent violent clashes. Their conflicts and feuds became so 
intensified that imperial edicts from 1723 onward had begun to 
instruct local officials to bring them under the baojia control and 
make each baojia chief responsible for the registration of privately 
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possessed weapons. During the Qianlong period, in Leping, one 
pengzhang (leader of the shed people) was appointed in each of four 
large highland villages that surrounded the city from all sides, 
namely Dongxiang, Beixiang, Nanxiang, and Xixiang. They were to 
establish baojia offices and to account for the movement and 
settlement of the migrant p~pulation. '~ 
As new settlements became larger, and a violent and volatile local 
environment threatened the emerging pattern of the peasant 
household economy, these pengmin gradually formed their own 
lineages and organized themselves into a relatively autonomous and 
highly aggressive highland community. This reflected their 
characteristic "frontier spirit". The local community was commonly 
based on fictive kinship and lineage ties around which, as Averill 
writes, "a large number of people could be gathered in a short time 
to defend their economic or political interests."14 It was composed 
of a variety of social groups which more or less evolved around and 
depended on various forms of commercial agriculture. Thus, within 
the community, social differentiation prevailed and patron-client 
politics predominated. Local strongmen, village leaders, landlords, 
and merchants pursued their own private interests as much as those 
of the community. Heterodox organizations such as secret societies, 
bandit gangs, and smuggler bands also sprang up and served as 
alternative and informal social organizations to ensure the local 
people security of subsistence and access to land and market. While 
the basis of production remained the peasant household economy, 
the highland community constituted in many ways an important 
relations of production. 
The Nature of Indigo Production and Trade 
Indigo emerged as a popular cash crop in Leping primarily because 
of its successful adaptation on the highland, which was unsuitable 
for the cultivation of rice or other grains. Compared to other areas, 
the local red alluvial and phosphate rich soil contributed to its 
prolific production on hills and valleys and yielded on an average 
between 1.6 to 1.8 dan per mu - the best in China. Besides this, its 
attractive market prices ensured profitable returns to early im- 
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migrants. According to contemporary local agricultural hand-books, 
it fetched ten times more profit than rice or other grains, Local 
gazetteers mentioned that indigo producing peasants often earned 
twice as much as others.I5 Even as late as 1888, when rice prices 
began to spiral upwards, an Englishman, E.L. Oxenham, found 
indigo to be financially more lucrative than rice produced on 
average land.16 Indigo thus lured immigrants to vigorously open the 
available highland for its cultivation, In fact, its contemporary 
market value even galvanized small holders in the plains to plant 
it as a summer crop on their fertile rice land. The Leping district 
gazetteer found it cultivated on all kinds of land with the finest 
coming from the valley along the river.I7 Indigo thus dotted the 
landscape of Leping, and a few other highland districts of Jiangxi. 
In fact, the proliferation of such new cash crops as indigo, 
sugarcane and jute alongside the traditional crop, tea, in the 
Raozhou and Guangxin prfectures made the whole area deficient in 
rice.I8 
With an economy based predominantly on indigo, Leping 
emerged as one of the major specialized regions for its production, 
trade, and marketing in Jiangxi. Local production consisted of both 
the semi-dry and irrigated varieties. Vastly superior in quality, the 
semi-dry species of indigo was planted on the highland in October. 
Its leaves were first collected the following year in April before the 
plants flowered. The second picking was done in August, the 
quality of which was usually poorer than the first. On the highland, 
indigo was often either preceded by or intercropped with radishes. 
The traditional wet variety was a summer crop sown in May and 
harvested in August. Both varieties on the average yielded about 
two to three baskets of 80 to 90 jins per mu and both required a 
relatively drier period at the time of picking for production of the 
darkest quality of dye. The superior highland indigo, however, 
fetched almost double the price, which averaged between ten to 
fifteen silver dollars for two baskets as compared to five-six silver 
dollars for the same amount of the wet variety.lg It was marketed 
as a dye paste to the textile producing area. A cloth piece dyed in 
the light blue color earned somewhere between one to two 
thousand copper cash, and the one with the darkest blue was priced 
two to four thousand cash more than the bleached ~10th. '~ 
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The processing of dark green indigo leaves into the blue indigo 
dye promoted a rural handicraft industry. Robert Fortune found on 
the edges of fields in the indigo area large pits or tanks with each 
having the capacity of about four hundred jins of leaves. Mixed 
with lime, it turned into a thick paste of blue dye after fermenting 
for a few days. This paste based dye was carried in wooden barrels 
to the markets for sale. It was also not uncommon for peasants to 
sell raw leaves in baskets to the local middlemen-merchants who 
processed it in their own tanks for sale to the indigo stockists or 
whole sale dealers in the larger city markets." Like tea, paper, and 
textile based handicraft industries, the entrance of middleman- 
merchant capital in indigo promoted a characteristic agricultural 
putting-out system. This was marked by the emergence of rural 
households mortgaged to these merchants against grain -cash loans 
in return for either processed dye or indigo leaves at a prefixed 
price. Middleman-merchant capital thus, with or without its own 
manufacturing facilities, controlled to a great extent rural produce 
both at its points of production and distribution." Some of the local 
merchants acted independently but most of them were often linked 
in a coordinated hierarchical style with the larger city based 
whole-salers and guilds. While the nature of the relationship 
between peasants and middleman-merchants varied historically, 
both of them were often closely connected at the village level. This 
made the latter actively pursue local interests in their business 
dealings with indigo stockists at the urban market. One evidence of 
this, as we shall see later, was local merchants' support for and 
participation in the 1904 Uprising. 
Local trade, however, remained characteristic of the petty trade 
market, and consisted mostly of subsistence goods. At the end of 
the autumn harvest, the Leping peasants, as a local custom book 
indicates, sold products like indigo, sugar, Shaojiu (liquor), 
limestone, coal, etc., in outside markets in order to raise surplus 
cash to pay taxes and purchase salt, salted goods, and other items 
of daily use for the winter.23 The trade of the Yangzi delta during 
the Qing, according to Huang, "clearly consisted of only a minimum 
of rural-urban exchange. Peasants purchased mainly subsistence 
goods produced by other peasants. Part of the trade consisted of a 
unidirectional flow of surplus from countryside to town, mainly in 
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the form of refit payments, with nothing in return, and another 
large part, of peasant exchange for sub~istence."~~ It was therefore 
not surprising that the peasants, in their opposition to the im- 
position of a commercial tax in 1904, used the argument that indigo 
production was subsistence-oriented.25 
That the economy of the indigo producing peasant households 
progressively veered towards the subsistence-oriented commercial- 
ization can be explained by the nature of its production and lin- 
kages with the market. First, security of subsistence for highland 
peasants depended upon the relative gap between rice and indigo 
prices. As long as indigo fetched a sufficient amount of rice, 
peasants remained above the board. But during periods of dimi- 
nishing returns, peasants' options to shift or diversify their 
production remained limited. The nature of indigo production, 
especially its cultivation on land unsuitable for other crops and its 
year long gestatation period, often prohibited rural households from 
indulging in neo-classical utility- maximization behavior according 
to the ups and downs of the market. Moreover, the vigorous 
exploitation of the highland created the serious problem of soil 
erosion and over time reduced the yield. Some local peasants 
possessing better land did gradually shift to tobacco and other 
crops, but on the whole they clung compulsively to indigo even 
when its earlier, relatively better market value as compared to rice, 
began to decline. Following a behavioral pattern more akin to the 
"Chayanovian model" of self- exploitation, they coped with the 
problem of market fluctuations and diminishing returns by 
increasing their production. Export statistics from Jiangxi reflect 
this.26 Peasants dealt with periodic crises by tightening their own 
belt, employing many defensive strategies built over the time 
against the outside pressures. Second, the nature of marketing and 
trade in indigo inhibited large scale generation of surplus and the 
accumulation of productive investment. While its introduction to the 
highland promoted commercial agriculture, the shifting pattern of 
land tenure coupled with the continued predominance of small 
landholdings generally kept the peasant household economy 
fluctuating between, what Huang refers to as, "survival-driven" and 
"extractaction-driven" c~mmercialization.~~ It brought about 
involution - the rigidity created by the "inward eloboration of 
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details" and not transformative development in ag r i c~ l tu re .~~  
The Collapse of Indigo 
Till the end of the nineteenth century, buoyant prices relative to 
rice and the lack of outside competition kept the indigo production 
thriving. Except for a short fall during the massive Taiping 
devastations, export statistics from Jiujiang maritime customs 
indicate that annually on the average between 25,000 to 35,000 
piculs were exported from this port alone. The total production of 
indigo in Leping and the Yugan area during the peak period 
exceeded 100,000 baskets, worth roughly about a million yuan. The 
total output of these two districts was primarily exported to markets 
in China and abroad. So much so that the requirements of Jiangxi's 
cotton districts and famous xiapu cloth producing areas were met by 
coarser indigo produced in southern Ganzhou and the Jian 
distri~ts.~' 
Two significant developments, however, soon began to contract 
the income of indigo producing peasants. First, closer integration of 
the already commercially active Xinjiang region with larger 
international markets firmly linked the small peasant economy with 
long distance trade activities. The forced opening of Jiujiang as a 
foreign treaty port in 1861, and the appearance of steamship cargo 
traffic in Lake Boyang in 1896, considerably reduced the commercial 
importance of this region's traditionally active market towns and 
trade routes and more directly exposed the local economy to the 
larger world economy.30 Begnning with 1893, foreign indigo began 
to appear in large quantities in ~ h i n a . ~ '  Table 1 indicates the 
amount of foreign indigo imported in China between 1890-1911. 
The discovery of aniline dyes and synthetic indigo and its 
production in massive scale for commercial purposes signalled the 
end of the earlier monopoly of natural indigo. Its consequences 
were felt not only in China but in all the major indigo producing 
areas of the The competition from these cheaper foreign 
products, primarily the synthetic dyes, which were granted favor- 
able ad valorem duty concessions on German insistence, depressed 
the demand for and price of Chinese indigo. It also set in motion 
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the decline of Leping's indigo market. Signs of such recession were 
noted by an observer in 1901. A 1902 Jiangxi fiscal report indicated 
increasingly stagnant sales and the destruction of local indigo 
markets on account of the import of foreign indig0.3~ Even in the 
few smaller textile mills of Jiangxi, which had surfaced in the early 
twentieth century, the use of foreign indigo for cotton printing had 
become widespread.34 Taijiri notes that by 1910 the price of local 
indigo had declined from 10 to about 7-8 dollars per basket.35 
Detailed yearly patterns of indigo prices are not available. But 
suffice it to note that in the period when the prices of almost all 
agricultural goods were rising, that of indigo fell. 
Table 1. Import of Foreign Indigo in China 
Year  mount Year Amount 
Source: Li Wenzu, ed., Zhongguo jindai nongyeshi ziliao, Vol. I (Beijing: Sanlian 
Shudian, 1957), pp. 401-402. 
Second, the continuous upward trend in rice prices, beginning in 
1895, was coupled with sharp setbacks to the local indigo market. 
Table 2 is indicative of the movement of rice prices in Shanghai 
between 1890-1910, In 1888, when Oxenham reported a better profit 
margin in indigo as compared to rice, the Shanghai rice price was 
3.02 silver dollars per shi. Soaring increases wiped out the 
differential advantage which the indigo producers traditionally had. 
Taking inflationary trends into account, there was an increase from 
2,682 copper cash to a silver dollar in 1876, to 3,282 in 1910, at the 
official rate. Peasants thus paid more in copper cash for r i ~ e . 3 ~  
Increasing costs of rice together with declining demand and prices 
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I for indigo thus created a subsistence dilemma for the producers. 
Table 2 Rice Prices in Shanghai (silver dollarlshi). 
Source: Loren Brandt, "Chinese Agriculture and the International Economy, 
1870-1937: Reassesment", Exploration in Economic History, Vol. 22 (1985), p. 191. 
It was therefore not surprising that the rebels in 1904 pointed out their 
disadvantageous position as compared to rice  cultivator^.^^ The indigo 
cultivation and production thus began to progressively decline and, in spite of 
a short boom during the First World War, finally totally collapsed by the 
1920~.~' The area under indigo cultivation in the Yangzi region contracted 
under the prolonged depression. Between 1904-1909, it covered ten percent of 
the agricultural land; it declined to seven percent between 1914-19, and finally 
after 1929, only 0.5 percent of land was put into indigo p rodu~t ion .~~  In 
Leping, the quality of most of indigo-locked land, however, made it irreversible 
to the profitable production of other subsistence or cash crops. The basis of the 
subsistence based commercialization thus began to disintegrate. The reverber- 
ation of this crisis on the peasant household economy affected the local 
highland community which had over time developed around the indigo 
production, trade, and market. 
Crises of The Highland Community 
The burgeoning subsistence predicament of the indigo based 
peasant household economy coincided with the larger crisis of 
Leping's highland community. It was marked by the growing intru- 
sion of both state and Christian church in the local community 
circumscribing its traditional relative autonomy. Both were thus the 
major target of attacks once the Leping riot started. These charac- 
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teristics were evident in many late Qing tax riots and uprisings in 
different areas. As Praznaik demonstrates, encroachments from 
outside along with economic issues affected the traditional com- 
munity and provided the moral basis for indignation and tumult in 
local areas.40 
The Nature of State Intervention and the Local Crisis 
During the first decade of the twentieth century, the financially 
beleaguered Qing state made major attempts to stabilize its fiscal 
deficits through the readjustment of old taxes and the introduction 
of new special taxes on commercial items. These were meant for 
either costly foreign indemnity payments, governance, or the new 
reform policy. In Leping, between 1895-1904, the salt tax was 
re,adjusted four times, increasing its cost every time?' Under the 
State salt monopoly, the allocation of Huainan salt from the far off 
northern region had already kept the local salt prices artificially 
high - especially in view of an easier and cheaper access to salt from 
the neighboring producing districts of Zhejiang and Fujian through 
the ~ushan-  Meiling overland trade route. Salt smuggling under the 
auspices of the local secret societies thus flourished, and so did the 
activities of the state's salt checking barriers. The state also read- 
justed lijin duties on indigo in 1902. The new schedule fixed a duty 
of 262 copper cash on a "Tianjin basket" of 105 jin, 250 copper cash 
on the "Road basket" of 100 jin, and 225 copper cash on a "Village 
basket:' of 90 jin respectively,42 The rationalization of the tax 
structure through the creation of such offices as the Tongshuizhu or 
Baoshangzhu, and the expansion of lijin on 57 species of dyes and 
colors and on most of other produce for the market "beyond one 
peck of rice, one chicken or other animal, one foot of silk, one piece 
of cotton cloth, one load of firewood, and bonafide personal effects,:' 
burdened the populace.43 It limited the scope for, what Wright 
calls, "a politic spirit of give and take".44 
There were thus ample reasons f ~ r  the indignation of .the indigq 
producing peasants. But what prompted the riot was a new tax 
which threatened the rights and privileges of the local indigo based 
rural community, Pursuing its "new policy" of modernization, the 
state issued a decree in 1904 to the *district governments, ordering 
the establishment of western style, modern schools. This required 
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the generation of additional revenues at the local level. In Leping, 
the district magistrate Tu Linguan, in consultation with members of 
the urban gentry, taxed indigo - the major commodity of sale in the 
local market, having the potential to provide funds necessary for the 
new school. The amount of the tax was not high; only one copper 
cash per dun. It was to be paid by those peasants and the local 
merchants who sold processed indigo dyes to the urban stockists 
and their agents in the specialized indigo market in Xixiang village. 
Wang Mou, a member of the urban gentry and minor official in the 
district administration, was assigned the task of collecting this sur- 
charge at the indigo market in Xixiang. The plan for the school, the 
nature of the tax, and the appointment of an outsider as the 
tax-collector in a scheme devised by the urban gentry portended a 
threat to and intrusion in the traditional autonomy of the local 
community. 
The policy to shift education (as it appeared so in the variety of 
activities initiated by the state in 1904) from private to public realm, 
created a sense of insecurity among those local elites who 
customarily supervised the village schools. It would be wrong to 
assume that peasants were against the schools. In rural areas, the 
sishu, which were usually private-one teacher tutorial schools, were 
the main means of imparting education.45 These schools received 
neither public funds nor recognition. The common practice in the 
region was to set aside a portion of clan land to provide for the 
running of the sishu as well as subsidies for the education of 
promising local children. It was one of those many social and 
cultural tasks of clan and village leaders which were the source of 
their local prestige and leg i t ima~y.~~ 
Moreover, the setting up of the sishu, as Borthwick demonstrates, 
was often arbitrary, fluid, informal, and responsive. Classes were 
conducted in the agriculturally slack season in local community 
temples, or in other makeshift facilities available in the area. 
Students paid fees either in cash or in kind according to their 
economic conditions, or earned the right to free education as a 
member of the predominant local clan or lineage. Teachers indulged 
in multiple other tasks as doctors, letter or complaint writers, 
fortune tellers and peddlers. The sishu were thus a part of the 
"common mode of preindustrial but commercialized societies in 
which education had left the home but had not yet taken up its 
abode in the elaborated structure of a school system."47 Amenable 
to the larger local environment, its style of functioning was 
considered convenient as compared to the formal public schools. 
Thus, when the sishu were still an active part of the traditional local 
set up, the scheme to raise funds for an urban school from rural 
market participants appeared unjust. It generated apprehensions 
regarding its consequences among local peasants, school teachers 
and rural gentry. 
The tax also violated the customary use-rights of peasants and 
village merchants to process indigo leaves into the dye paste or 
powder for sale in the market in Xixiang. Home-processed indigo 
was now declared a commercial commodity and its sale was levied 
upon. It affected even the peasant peddlers of indigo leaves. They 
received less for their product. Local merchants, following the 
prevailing practice, often deducted a certain amount from the price 
paid to the peasants to shift their own burden. The tax, actually 
meant for the manufactured commercial item, encumbered all those 
involved in indigo production, market, and trade. Already subjected 
to various payments at the Leping district's lijin barrier, registration 
office, and baojia office (which charged an examination fee) in the 
process of transporting indigo to the market, the new exaction 
became an onerous burden. Moreover, in the context of their 
subsistence-oriented production, peasants found the segregation of 
indigo for the new tax discriminatory. In their complaints, they 
therefore vehemently emphasized their increasingly adverse 
position as compared to cultivators of rice and other grains, Not 
only were they affected by market fluctuations, but the lower 
quality of their land also restricted the cultivation of a second crop 
for subsistence. They questioned why, as opposed to rice or other 
grains, should indigo be taxed?.48 
If the purpose and nature of the surcharge seemed irrational to 
the indigo producers and local middlemen-merchants, not less 
irksome was the assignment of its collection to a member of the 
urban gentry, Wang Mou, and not to the village headmen or rural 
elites. Wang was a notorious land grabber reputed locally for his 
corrupt practices. Most probably an absentee landlord, his wealth 
had earned him the position of an assistant official in the di~trict.~' 
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His presence and activities were resented by all the local people - 
and especially by those powerful rural landlords and village 
headmen who traditionally assisted in the tax collection. They 
contested the transfer of power from a local to an outside agency. 
Thus, when the riot started, it received support from almost all 
sectors of the local community. 
The Christian Church, Foreigners and Local Indignance 
In Leping, the anti-missionary or anti-foreign stance of peasants in 
the 1904 Uprising was, like elsewhere in China, to a great extent 
linked to the local activities of the Christian church. Its practices and 
beliefs were contrary to the established local norms, and its 
heterodox membership provoked the community's indignation. In 
Jiangxi, missionary activities had a long history. The first church in 
the province was established by the Jesuit Matteo Ricci at Nanchang 
in 1594. The Yongzheng emperor's proscription of Christianity in 
1724, however, curtailed its growth in the whole of China. With the 
intrusion of western imperialism in the mid-19th century, French 
Lazaristes raced ahead in the province, establishing themselves 
particularly in the northern, eastern and southern districts. The 
chapel in Leping was built by them. They were soon joined by 
Protestants who became separately entrenched in this area. The 
number of Christians, however, remained limited in the province, 
totalling between 20 to 40,000 by 1900.50 
The membership of the Christian church was usually constituted 
of, what Fairbank describes as, "those elements of the Chinese 
populace that were least loyal to the established order."51 The 
information on Christian membership in Leping is not available. 
Mao's following detailed description of the local Christian converts 
in Xunwu area in southeast Jiangxi is, however, suggestive. He 
writes that they: 
include widows (including poor peasants) and elderly women 
(landlords' wives) (30 percent); sly and capricious gentry and 
their families (30 percent); peasants of small and powerless 
lineages (20 percent- peasants belonging to big and powerful 
lineages do not convert); and young intellectuals of landlord 
origins without prospects (10 percent); the remaining ten per- 
cent of members are of all types. These converts can be 
divided into two groups: the very bad and the very weak. The 
bad ones are not loafers, but they are wicked and crafty local 
people who want to be strongmen - the church is a means by 
which to accomplish this. The other group of people are the 
weak; their purpose is to seek shelter in the church?2 
It was thus marginal elements within the local society which thus 
appears formed the core mefibership of the church in other 
districts of Jiangxi too, 
Inspite of their almost negligible numbers, and their base among 
the weaker and most marginal group of the population, e s -  
sionaries' strength in the local area derived from their intimhe 
connection with imperialist powers. Esherick's study of the Boxer 
Rebellion convincingly demonstrates the pattern of linkages 
between aggressive imperialism and 'vigorous missionary on- 
slaughts. This facilitated the church's rise as an autonomous 
political institution in local areas. Its ability to contest traditional 
power relationship and the attendant cultural and ideological norms 
naturally aroused hostility among the conservative members of the 
rural community.53 Missionaries' and their converts' aggressive 
defiance of local customs/. together with Chinese misunderstanding 
of western practices, were major sources of the recurrent trouble in 
the countryside. 
In his study of sectarian cases in Jiangxi between 1860 to 1895, 
Sweeten discusses the three most frequent reasons for local 
complaints and troubles. The first pertained to converts' refusal to 
contribute either to community festivals or to the maintenance of 
temples which were considered necessary for local prosperity and 
benefits. A complainant noted that once, after "the announcement 
[exempting converts] had been posted, it was not long before there 
was a storm damage. This we remembered and we could not then 
be at ease." Second, missionaries' defiance of the Chinese concept of 
geomanoy in selecting church sites harmed the local fengshui and 
injured people's fate. The last and most numerous were concerned 
with the multiple issues of conflict arising out of lineage and 
property litigations. Backed by missionaries, converts often 
attempted to settle personal scores with their enemies5* Local 
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attempts to control their activities brought charges of religious 
persecution and the intervention of foreign powers. Sensitive to the 
potential consequences, the state more often than not succumbed to 
their pressures. 
The aggressive infringement of missionaries and converts in local 
affairs naturally made them suspect in the eyes of the peasants, 
local gentry, and managers of community affairs. It generated 
hostility, but their presence was endured. In a period of local crisis, 
missionaries and their churches were, however, treated as symbols 
of ill-omen, casting evil influences on the society, and the latent 
hostility often manifested itself in outright violence. In 1899 and in 
1900, two anti-missionary riots in Leping were preceded by massive 
rains destroying the indigo crops.55 Peasants in Leping and nearby 
regions destroyed local chapels and attacked missionaries and 
converts. The number of minor incidents involving Christians and 
local people sharply increased, beginning with the twentieth cen- 
tury. British consular reports from Jiujiang mention many of these 
cases from the province. In 1901, the prefectures of Raozhou, of 
which Leping was a part, and Jianchang alone were held liable for 
the payment of a special levy of 360,000 taels to defray the Catholic 
indemnities arising out of riots and minor troubles. Its collection, as 
Clennell mentioned, caused "serious factional fights and much 
ag i t a t i~n" .~~  
In 1904, the anti-missionary sentiments were further provoked by 
such events as the intrusion of British gunboats in Lake Boyang and 
the successes of the Japanese against the Russians in the keenly 
watched Russo-Japanese War. This occasioned the appearance of 
i/ 
anonymous posters and the circulation of anti-foreign rumors in the 
region. The British rights to move gunboats in the inland waters of 
Boyang Lake, which formed the western boundary of Raozhou 
prefecture, were a matter of controversy since 1903.57 Against the 
British insistence on such rights to protect their commerce and 
subjects, the Chinese pleaded that "if ships of war proceed thither 
the suspicions of the ignorant populace may g v e  rise to trouble."58 
The British gun-boat "Tweed", however, moved in the lake on May 
13,1904. While no mishap occurred, the event was not taken kindly 
by the local people. Inflammatory posters vehemently denouncing 
the act appeared at many places. Clennell reported that "the 
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possibility of shallow draft gun-boats being used for hostile 
purposes in the interior of this province forms the manifest 
inspiration of portions of that document Added to this 
was the fear that gunboats would be followed by commercial steam 
ships, thus further displacing native junk boats from the %interior 
water routes and affecting the livelihood of a larger number of 
boatmen. 
Also, in 1904, each Japanese victory against the Russians showed 
that foreigners were not invincible. Anonymous posters proclaiming 
impending disaster and doomsday circulated. Towns and villages 
were rife with rumors of expected trouble, The North China Herald 
linked contemporary rumors to the rise of Boxerism and renewed 
secret society activities in the Yangzi treaty ports and in interior 
regions of ~Jiangxi and other neighboring provinces. It reported that 
"the entire sympathy seems to be with Japan." It expressed the view 
that "during the past months many references have been made to 
the reappearance of these minatory symptoms [i.e., the menace of 
Chinese secret societies] in different parts of China. The lesson of 
this phenomenon has not been lost on us. China is today just as 
ready for another upheaval as she was before unless due restraining 
influences are promptly set at work."60 
Missionaries, especially Catholics in northern Jiangxi, found the 
rumors disquieting and apprehended trouble. In direct contact with 
the local people in remote areas, they were better able to sense the 
brewing hostility. They, however, viewed it less in terms of their 
constant friction with local power factions and interpreted it more 
as xenophobia arising out of. the Japanese successes against the 
Russians. Bishop Ferrant of Jiujiang thus remarked that :!the 
population are being worked up by influences in very high places 
into an increasingly unfriendly attitude. If the Japanese are 
victorious in the present war all Europeans must look out for 'un 
mauvais quart d'heure'." Echoing same sentiments, Bishop Coqset 
opined that "every Japanese victory makes the Chinese official more 
arrogant, more intractable and more unjust. Every one regards the 
present conflict as, one between 'les jaunes' and 'les blancs'. The 
desire to 'se debarasser de nous' is always present, a race antipathy 
that nothing can overcome. It may break out into open violence 
immediately, or it may lie dormant for, years, but the war is being 
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attentively watched for the sake of the opportunities that it may 
offer for a renewal of the effort to get rid of Europeans which was 
attempted in 1900."~' 
But these rumors cannot be dismissed as an over-reaction. 
Anticipating trouble, local merchants hoarded grain and the gov- 
ernors of the Yangzi provinces ordered the movement of troops to 
strategic and sensitive areas. These activities, instead of abating the 
rumors, provided further credence to them. So much so that the 
Qing state finally issued a decree stating that: "Although there have 
been copious rains this spring, the price of grain still keeps its 
abnormally high mark, while the various kinds of marketable goods 
continue to demand high prices. An investigation reveals to us the 
fact that this has been due to the war now in progress in the eastern 
portion, which, coupled with the numerous rumors flying about, 
has compelled merchants to hesitate in embarking in business 
thereby causing a block in the free transportation of goods and 
cargoes. This is a matter affecting greatly the welfare of trade and 
of our subjects." It exhorted "the people to go on with their trades 
and businesses and not to believe in rumors which could only hurt 
them."62 
The Secret Society and the Highland Community 
The increasing powerlessness of the local highland community in 
effectively managng the contemporary crisis intensified secret 
society (or hui dung) activities in Leping, and other areas of 
northeastern Jiangxi. Bastid notes that "the predominance of hui tang 
(secret societies) with declared political and social pretensions, over 
chiao men (sects), which were more specifically religous, seems to 
parallel directly the growth of an unemployed population of 
uprooted elements and social rejects, for whom hui tang offered a 
kind of protection of security."63 The hui dung originally consisted of 
disbanded soldiers and "braves" of the imperial anti-Taiping armies, 
as well as unemployed boatmen and coolies - traditionally the 
backbone of lively trade routes in this regon. It, however, soon 
increasingly attracted not only the marginal elements within society, 
but also peasants and those members of the local gentry who found 
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themselves progressively marginalized and their social and cultural 
status threatened. 
Contemporary reports from Jiangxi indicate the proliferation, of 
hui dang activities in highland areas. These observed that "the 
vagrant people are overwhelmingly ruffians who rush to them 
[secret societies] like water to a big pool; village fools hasten to seek 
them."64 Known by various names, branches of these Triad-affiliated 
secret societies flourished in the whole of the province. Among 
them, most prominent were huis (bands) of Hongjiang, Hongbang, 
Honglian, Sandian, Biangang, Jinhuashan, Wolongshan, Xiliangshan, 
Jianghushan, Xichenshan, and Yihe ~huan.~ '  Several of these 
derived their names from local hills, indicating their linkages to a 
particular local highland community. Many were interregional. For 
example, by 1904, the hui dang of Guangxi was already active in 
Jiangxi-Hunan border areas, and that of Leping and the nor- 
theastern region of Jiangxi had expanded to southern Anhui and 
Hubei, According to Dongfang zazhi, most secret society disturbances 
were the result of the internal apprehensions of the people arising 
from such external factors as missionary activities, market town 
crises, and the increasing movement of foreign gunboats and troops 
in the remote and interior regions.66 That such apprehensions 
gripped the whole of the rural community is indicated by the 
heterogeneous social character of the riots and uprisings in the fifst 
decade of the twentieth century. 
In Leping and northeastern Jiangxi, the most active branch of the 
hui dang was Bianganghui (Whip the Strong Society), popularly 
known as the "Beggars' Guild". Its local chief, Xia Yanyi, was also 
the leader of the 1904 Uprising. Unfortunately, details regarding the 
history and development of this society are not available. Whatever 
little information we have indicates that it was organizationally 
based in various village and urban markets of this region, with its 
main center located at an old temple in the Lizhu mountains on the 
boundaries ,of Leping and Wuyuan, Anhui province.67 Its activities 
were geared toward the collection of levies from shop keepers and 
other wealthy persons in return for granting them protection from 
the importunity of beggqrs. It was also active in the maintenance of 
traditional customs and norms in the area with the active support 
of members of the local gentry and "scholars". Such tasks led to 
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! frequent conflicts with the Christians, especially Roman Catholics, 
who encouraged converts to defy local customs and practices as 
heathen. 
i A 1904 report illustrates the nature of Bianganghui's local ac- 
1 tivities. In Taiping, a market town of Linchiang district, this society 
1 once imposed a fine of 26 Chinese dollars on a prominent Catholic 
convert for "adulterous co-habitation with another man's wife." Not 
only did the accused not pay any fine but, with the help of other 
converts, also assaulted those "beggars" who were sent for its 
collection. Enraged, the "beggars", aided by sympathetic "scholars", 
pulled down three Catholic houses. The local priest then 
complained to the district officials and three rioters were arrested. 
Affronted by the treatment meted out to them, the "beggars" and a 
thousand of their supporters entered the district town of Linchiang, 
besieged the Yamen, and attacked both Catholic and Protestant 
converts. The local Bishop fled and telegraphed the Governor to 
send troops. The rioters dispersed as soon as a police force arrived 
to intercept them. While nobody was killed, the Catholics de- 
manded an indemnity of 12,000 Chinese dollars and punishment of 
the ringleaders. The local people, the report observed, were 
overwhelmingly against the Catholics. They not only justified the 
Beggars' Guild's "right to impose fines for breaches of domestic 
morality" but also strongly deplored the Catholics' recourse to 
official help in such a discreditable action.68 This event indicates the 
role played by the Bianganghui in preserving local tradition, and the 
reasons for its recurrent problem with foreigners. 
The 1904 Uprising 
The timing of the tax collection finally triggered the Leping riot.69 
In the month of June 1904, some districts of northeastern Jiangxi 
suffered from heavy rains. They caused a flood in the Lean river 
and damaged the summer crop.70 The prolonged wet weather du- 
ring the leaf picking season lowered the quality as well as the price 
of indigo in the market. The trouble began when Wang Mou to- 
gether with Yamen underlings and runners suddenly descended on 
the indigo market in Xixiang from Leping city. To make a killing 
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from his new authority, he started ifidiscriminately collecting the 
tax, totally disregarding the local conditions of production, 
According to the North China Herald: "the mandarin and his 
underlings took advantage of the power given by the central 
government to raise funds for such schools if there be no available 
money on hand and squeezed the merchants by making such a 
heavy imposition that the people of the city resenteddW7' 
Wang's activities jolted the whole community. It appears that 
while Wang squeezed both dye selling peasants and local middle- 
man-merchants, peasant peddlers of indigo leaves were exploited 
by the urban merchants, Aggrieved, they sought the help of locally 
active Bianganghui to press upon the urban merchants to resist the 
levy. Members of the rural gentry, many of whom had connections 
with the hui dang, and Xixiang's landlord and the head of local 
baojia office, Cai Mou, also stood behind them. Petitions were sent 
to the district magistrate to withdraw the tax. When these failed, 
they called upon all the shopkeepers and merchants in the district 
city to observe a general strike. Their appeal fell through as many 
did not cooperate. Finally, a force of several hundred peasants 
entered Leping on July 21,1904 to seek justice. 
The rebel force was led by the local leader of Bianganghui, Xia 
Yanyi, Pockmarked Xia, also known as Huntian or Huntian maze 
(Starry Firmament) was a resident of Dongbei village in Leping. The 
fusion of Bianganghui's anti-foreignism with the indigo tax resistance 
extended the scope of the uprising. This appealed to all those who 
related the source of their plight to the increasing import of cheap 
foreign indigo on the one hand, and to the baleful repurcussions of 
new western style schools on the other. Rumors about the im- 
pending crisis and prevalent anti-missionary sentiments united 
various social groups. The rebels thus received immediate support 
from a large section of the community, as well as from many local 
branches of the hui dang. Their strength was bolstered by continuous 
reinforcement from the countryside. Transcending its narrow 
anti-tax base, the Uprising soon became a struggle of rural against 
urban forces. 
After entering the city, the rebels first attacked the hated building 
of the new school - the source of their current problehz. They then 
plundered the local Baojia office and looted forty guns. By the next 
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~ day, their strength had reached three thousand as more and more 
I peasants joined them. On July 22, they turned against the local 
Christians, burning the city's Catholic chapel and destroying the 
houses and properties of local converts. Soon, the Central Tax Office 
and the lijin barrier also fell victim to their fury. The residence of 
1 
I the despised indigo tax collector, Wang, was destroyed. On July 23, 
emboldened by their success, the rebels moved against the district 
anti smmugling check post and the salt tax barrier. Two gunboats, 
employed to check the thriving smuggling bands operating on 
water ways under the auspices of secret societies, were burned. 
They thus systematically attacked all those offices of the state which 
burdened them by exercising a tremendous control over their 
socio-economic lives. Corrupt and oppressive officials and their 
agents were selectively sought out and attacked. Tu Linguang, the 
district magistrate, saved himself from assault by going into hiding. 
Commenting on this "moment of madness" in Leping, the North 
China Herald equated the rebel force to "a mob which at once like all 
mobs throughout the world began to seek for victims to de~troy."~' 
But, the eclectic targets of the rebels were to a great extent a 
reflection of its composition, which included not only peasants and 
members of the Bianganghui but also merchants, landlords, village 
leaders, and rural gentry. All of these were part of the local 
community involved in indigo production, distribution and trade. 
Each of the groups within the community carried out its own 
vendetta against the forces which were considered to be disrupting 
its autonomy. The riot thus witnessed multiple parallel movements. 
Its significance lies in a conjuncture - a meeting point of all the 
social forces that shaped the indigo based local community. But 
after the initial fury, each social group indulged in its separate 
contests and compromises and accordingly joined or defected from 
the ranks of rebels. The fate of the Uprising thus depended upon 
the extent to which the alignment between each parallel group 
continued. 
In Leping, the rebels kept the city besieged for several days and 
dispersed to the countryside after giving vent to their anger. Their 
effective blockade of the city, snapping its linkages with the outside 
world, and their large numbers, inflated by constant reinforcement 
from villages prevented strong resistance by the local state forces. 
When the news of the incident finally reached Nanchang, Governor 
Xiashi took prompt action. He apprehended trouble as recent 
anti-missionary riots in Xinchang district had led to the French 
intervention and large indemnity payments. He immediately 
dispatched Feng Yulin, who was appointed the new district 
magistrate, with Jaozhou's expectant Daotai Zhu Zechuan and 
hundred soldiers to Leping. Feng, a report noted, "wise above his 
generation managed to get sick en route and had to return to 
Nanchang to be doctored."73 Zhu thus proceeded to Leping alone, 
sometime in late August. He was welcomed not only by the urban 
gentry but also by Xixiang's merchant participants in the Uprising. 
As the peasants reorganized themselves in eight neighboring 
villages to deal with Zhu's forces, these merchants lost control over 
the movement. Apprehending the impending campaign of suppres- 
sion, they defected, blaming Xia for all the turmoil. Thus, by the 
time Zhu's forces had arrived, merchant supporters of the Uprising, 
apparently alarmed by the spreading popular nature of the move- 
ment, declared their willingness to submit to indemnity payments, 
On August 24, Zhu sent runners with three of his bodyguards to 
Dongbei village to arrest Xia. Not finding Xia there, they instead 
imprisoned his wife and a close associate named Wu. When soldiers 
came to the village again on the next day, Xia detained three of 
them and threatened their execution and an attack on the city if his 
wife was not set free immediately. Anonymous posters to this effect 
also appeared in the city, granting immunity and protection to all 
those merchants who acquiesced to the rebels. A rumor circulated 
settifig August 27 as the date of the insurrection. Frightened, the 
district magistrate released Xia's wife and ceremoniously sent her 
off in a sedan-chair. Xia nonetheless entered the city with about 
three thousand armed followers on August 26, a day earlier than 
rumored. They opened the city gate using a cannon. Militia and 
peasant forces of the rural landlords and clan leaders Wang Detai, 
Zou Kewang, Wang Dingwo, and Wang Xixian of Dongxiang and 
Xixiang villages, and Ding, Wang and Ye of Nanxiang village also 
joined them. The combined force numbered between 10 to 20 
thousand by the time it reached and surrounded the district Yamen. 
Zhu panicked and ordered his small force to open fire on this rebel 
force which greatly outnumbered them. That is when an orgy of 
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1 violence began. 'The hundred soldiers who composed Chu [Zhu] 
taotai's bodyguard", according to a report, "were almost annihilated 
while their commander was one of the first to be cut down. Chu 
taotai himself and the chihhsien of Leping county were also severely 
wounded by sword cuts whereupon they ran into an inner apart- 
ment. The mob then set fire to the building and it is probable that 
these two officials lost their lives in the conflagration since nothing 
more has been heard of them."74 Zhu, however, escaped in disguise. 
Once in the city, the peasant rebels again followed a predictable 
pattern of violence and destruction. Their objectives were limited 
and their targets defined. They burned down the district Yamen, 
forced open the district prison, killed or wounded more than sixty 
of three hundred odd soldiers, destroyed six houses of the Wang 
clan - one of whose members was the notorious indigo tax collector 
Wang Mou - and harassed corrupt officials, runners and local 
Christian converts. Renegade local shopkeepers and merchants were 
their major targets. Shops and properties of those merchants "who 
started and encouraged the rioters in the beginning" were raided 
and plundered.75 The city was once again besieged. Rebels defended 
their actions by invoking the notion of traditional justice. Their ral- 
lying cry was that "all they want is justice and that they will resist 
to the death if the Government sends down troops to enforce the 
exorbitant taxes demanded by lijin runners."76 Having accomplished 
their limited objectives, the rebels swiftly dispersed and permitted 
the restoration of law and order in the city. "Since this affair and the 
plundering that ensued afterwards inside the city," it was reported, 
"better classes have regained control of the mob, who were on the 
point of breaking into open rebellion against the Government, and 
no more pillaging of shops or dwelling is now allowed."77 
By the end of August, the Uprising had essentially run its course. 
But rumors about the imminent arrival of French gunboats and 
soldiers to protect the French Lazaristes and ensure the exaction of 
indemnity payments kept rebels guarding all the strategic points 
leading to the city. Armed with muskets, swords and spears, they 
regrouped in nine regments. Leading the main force oi about two 
thousand rebels from Dongbeixiang, Xia defended the route from 
the famous porcelain town Jingdezhen at the strategic Wuli 
checkpost in the north. Regiments of the clan landlords Wang, Tong 
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and Ye from Ylidu and Wudu posted themselves on the hill top of 
Denggaoshan guarding the eastern route to the city from Dexing 
and Anhui's Wuyuan districts. Clan landlords Wang and Que 
stationed their forces at Shizhenjie checkpost located forty li from 
the city on Gujinshan to defend the western route from Boyang, 
Wannian and Yugan. Noting the extensive mobility of rebel 
peasants, the Zhongwai Ribao warned that further provocations and 
mishandling of the situation could endanger peace in South Anhui 
and the regions. in the north and south of Yangzi at any time, 
bringing a large area of China into the grip of the Upr i~ ing .~~  
An imperial force finally quickly moved to Weiyuan, in Anhui 
province, to prevent the expansion of the Uprising. In Jiangxi, 
Governor Xiashi sent the Daotai bf Jiujiang, Rui Zheng, to Leping 
with about a thousand soldiers of the Jiujiang company armed with 
modern breech-loading rifles. This troop was assisted by the 
Guangxin soldiers and gunboats. The "Battle of Raozhou", as the 
government soldiers called it, was fierce and lasted for several days. 
On September 7, the British consul Clennell wrote that the situation 
in Leping "is still one of increasing gravity" and a "great deal of 
fighting has occurred, the rioters being armed with gingalls 
[home-made cannons], & c." The Daotai might not be able to return 
before the end of this month and he had sent a "dispatch yesterday 
ordering three 'liang tzu' - i,e., 750 men - to Loping from Kiu- 
kiangU7' 
Rui reached Shizhenjie, the eastern checkpost of Leping city, on 
September 16. Confronted by a massive superior forcei and fearing 
harsh reprisals, the clan landlords guarding the post simply melted 
away. Strong local rumors about Xia's plan to once again besiege 
the city prompted Rui to take control over Leping on the same day. 
Xia had, meanwhile, already escaped out of the city. He made a last 
valiant effort to engage the Imperial force on the highland of his 
homeground at the twin village of Lu Le. His forces dug trenches 
there, flooded the cropland, and fixed carriage guns. Before the 
arrival of the Imperial army, his major supporter - the local village 
landlord and baojia chief, Cai Mou, also panicked and defected. 
Completely demoralized by this, the peasant force also dispersed 
and fled on September 19. Xia and his small band of supporters 
probably died in a later search operation carried out by Rui's 
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soldiers. Other rebel leaders were caught and executed sometime in 
1 November?' After about two months of turmoil, this massive 
anti-indigo tax uprising thus petered out. 
I 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the 1904 Uprising in Leping's highland followed from 
multiple crises arising out of a particular conjuncture of forces in 
the first decade of the twentieth century. Under the external 
pressures of the international trade and growing imports of the 
cheap synthetic aniline dyes, the far-famed local indigo no longer 
commanded a monopoly over the market. This threatened the 
subsistence based customary process of production in indigo on the 
local highland, and strained rural households to preserve themsel- 
ves from disintegration. The tax on indigo to implement the state's 
"new policy" of modernization therefore became an onerous burden. 
At this critical juncture, state interventions and missionary 
infringements also assailed the traditional autonomy of the highland 
community. The state's transfer of tax collection rights to an outside 
agency threatened to weaken the traditional intermediary power 
and status-holders in the community. It exposed the state's 
predatory face. In fact, as Prazniak's study notes, most of the late 
Qing riots were triggered by the deputation of reform managers to 
local tax collection. These managers were not traditional village or 
community leaders, but urban, lower degree holders and wealthy 
merchants. Together with the Yamen's sub-bureaucracy of clerks 
and runners, they "attempted to encroach on village resources in 
order to raise funds for the reform programs. Taking a variety of 
forms, including taxation, usurpation of temple property, and 
attacks on the jurisdiction of rural leaders, these encroachments 
raised political and moral as well as economic issues. Rural leaders 
responded to these actions by mobilizing secular and spiritual 
organizations which were an ongoing integral part of village life."" 
It thus marked the weakening of those linkages which bound the 
rural community to the larger society. 
Missionaries, on the other hand, contested local customs and ri- 
tuals linked with the maintenance of traditional patterns in the 
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productive cycle, and threatened shared values and notions of the 
local community. With their autonomous and extra-local base of 
power, they and their converts emerged as rivals to community and 
clan leaders, local priests, and other managers of social and cultural 
affairs. They provoked strong anti-foreignism at the local level. The 
growing subsistence crisis of the peasant household economy, and 
the disempowerment of the highland community, were thus back- 
drops against which the local implication for the tax on indigo to 
raise funds for the school was judged. 
The 1904 Leping Uprising was an effort by the highland commu- 
nity to defend itself from external disruptive forces. This is evinced 
in the alignment of such heterogeneous social groups as peasants, 
merchants, landlords, village leaders, and secret society members 
against the forces of the state, local market and the Christian 
church. Even after the suppression of the Uprising, local landlords 
and merchants continued to protect and shelter rebels8' All of them 
opposed the imposition of a fine of twenty-eight thousand silver 
dollars for the destruction of official and missionary properties. 
They agreed to rebuild all the official Chinese buildings but, as a 
North China Herald report indicates, "positively refuse[d] to have 
anything to do with the restoration of R.C. Mission property in spite 
of threats and cajoling on the part of  mandarin^."^^ Another later 
report further stated that "so bitter is the hatred of the people of 
Lopingshan [Leping highland] against the Roman Cathedral con- 
verts there that they have been heard to declare that unless the 
chapel be removed from the city, there will be another and more 
sanguinary riot against the converts the moment troops are 
~ithdrawn."'~ In the wake of strong opposition from the local com- 
munity, the district officials did not collect the indemnity. This 
indicates the strong communal consensus against the state and the 
church. 
Yet, it was also an uprising which integrated seveial parallel 
movements. Each of these movements was characterized by the 
social differentiation which prevailed within the highland commu- 
nity. The private interests of various social groups at their own 
particular stages overrode those of the larger community. Each 
group participated in the movement out of its own limited objec- 
tives, and defected one by one as its private interests were threa- 
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I 
I tened. This internally weakened the Uprising, subverted the 
I 
communal consensus and led to its collapse as soon as a larger 
I 
I imperial force descended on Leping. The revolt was thus in the 
, largest sense communal (against outsiders like the state and tax 
collectors as well as foreigners) but the most active element was 
1 
I 
indigo producing peasants. Some elements like the local indigo 
I merchants sought tactical alliance with peasant rebels whereas the 
I Bianganghui and rural lineages fought almost to the bitter end 
1 because outside intervention threatened their traditonal rights and 
privileges in the community. On the whole, these patterns of the 
highland economy and society are also indicative of why these 
regions turned into the major breeding ground of Communist 
insurrection during the late 1920s and early 1930s in Central and 
South China. 
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